Lessons from the Celltech Case:

Balancing Knowledge Exploration and

Exploitation in Organizational Renewal by McNamara, Peter & Baden-Fuller, Charles
Introduction
Can high technology firms renew? The classical
view of industry evolution emphasizes the dif-
ficulties that firms face in adjusting to new cir-
cumstances; cognitive and organizational inertia
are often blamed for resistance. Longitudinal
studies of renewal usually exclude studies of high
technology (such as Baden-Fuller and Stopford,
1994; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). The story of
Intel (Burgelman and Grove, 1996) is an exception,
but this story stresses the role of serendipity and
the accidental nature of the process (Burgelman,
1994).
Here we tell another story, that of Celltech, 
one of Europe’s largest and oldest biotechnology
firms, which managed to renew itself under the
direction of a new CEO. Celltech pushed back its
historic trajectory, an unusual feat. We make no
pretence that Celltech is a common story. In its
early life, Celltech had two businesses: pure R&D
of novel therapeutic drugs, and a much bigger
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This article applies the lens of the knowledge exploration/exploitation dilemma to the
renewal of Celltech Plc. From a theoretical perspective it has often been argued that as
a firm matures, exploitation of current organizational knowledge drives out exploration
of new ideas, and that this increases the likelihood of firm failure. This same literature
gives few clues as to how balance can be maintained, or decline reversed. Our case study
documents the decline of Celltech, its rejuvenation from near bankruptcy in 1990, and
its subsequent ability to prosper to become the eighth largest biotech firm in the EU in
terms of market capitalization. Through the Celltech case we show empirically that
renewal based on exploration is possible even in a firm where exploitation has come to
dominate. This case also illustrates how a balance between exploration and exploitation
can be maintained for over half a decade, despite the theoretical tendency stated in the
literature for exploitation to dominate. We offer insights into the process of maintaining
a balance, including reorganization to release internal diversity to stimulate exploration,
creation of a common language, and building systems to institutionalize the maintenance
of a balance between exploration and exploitation.
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business undertaking specialized contract manu-
facturing. In this latter area, it developed a
leading edge technological capability centred on
recombinant DNA and hybridoma technologies
(Dodgson, 1991, 1993). It then hit a crisis and un-
usually shifted its emphasis, diminishing contract
manufacturing and greatly expanding and alter-
ing its strategic focus towards drug discovery and
development in a higher technological space. This
was unusual in that it defied the theoretical con-
vention that exploitation of current knowledge
tends, over time, to dominate over exploration for
new knowledge (Levinthal and March, 1993;
March, 1991). Despite the fact that this R&D
investment has yet to yield a drug approved for
marketing by regulatory authorities, this strategic
shift has resulted in the firm becoming more,
rather than less, successful financially. In 1990
Celltech was a privately owned firm near bank-
ruptcy. By February 1999 it had been listed on the
London Stock Exchange for six years. It had a
market capitalization of $502 million, making it
the eighth largest independently quoted bio-
technology firm in Europe, fifth in the UK
(McNamara, 1999).
Theory
It is widely argued in the literature that a central
component of success is the maintenance of a
balance of exploration and exploitation2 within the
firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Hendry, 1996;
Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal and March, 1993). In
common with others, March (1991) observed that
the maintenance of a balance between exploration
and exploitation is ‘a primary factor in system sur-
vival and prosperity’. Celltech’s story, elaborated
below, runs counter to the oft stated theoretic
proposition in the literature that exploitation
tends to dominate over exploration. This logic is
summed up by Levinthal and March (1993):
‘Exploitation generates clearer, earlier and closer
feedback than exploration. It corrects itself sooner
and yields more positive returns in the near term.
As a result, the primary challenge to sustaining 
an optimal mix of exploration and exploitation is
the tendency of rapid learners and successful
organisations to reduce the resources allocated to
exploration.’
In mature organizations exploitation tends to
drive out exploration, making renewal based on
exploration very difficult. Renewal based on the
creation and application of new core capabilities
is very difficult (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Peteraf,
1993). The key problem is that the development
of core capabilities tends to be path-dependent
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990, 1994; Collis,
1991; Mahoney, 1995). The initial success of a core
capability leads to its growth over time. Success
based on the exploitation of that core capability
reinforces the behaviours upon which it is based.
Over time these behaviours become deeply em-
bedded in the organization. This process of deep-
ening a core capability enables the firm to refine
its organizational routines and procedures in
knowledge integration to such a point that it
knows more than any other firm about how to
deliver, efficiently and effectively, value added to
a particular market. But as market needs change
over time, other knowledge bases may emerge to
deliver superior value added. This shift may
‘maroon’ established ‘mature’ firms, leaving them
with core capabilities that are no longer appro-
priate (Herriott, Levinthal and March, 1985;
Miller, 1993). The resulting rigidities are due to
the high switching costs involved in changing core
capabilities (Kogut and Zander, 1992); inertia
within the organization (Huff, Huff and Thomas,
1992); and the high level of uncertainty (and hence
cost) attached to investments in the exploration
of new knowledge (Levinthal and March, 1993;
March, 1991).
As the firm hits a performance crisis the natural
predisposition of employees is to get out of trouble
by focusing on doing what they currently do more
efficiently. They rely on the core competencies of
the past to deliver success once more. Efficiency
drives enable the firm to avoid confronting the
very difficult realization that its past core com-
petencies are now core rigidities and must be re-
placed, rather than overhauled. It is very difficult
for organizational members to abandon past suc-
cessful behaviours and explore new knowledge
upon which to create new core competencies that
better meet the needs of the market.
There is, of course, a literature on corporate re-
structuring and renewal. The restructuring strand
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2 Exploration can be defined as ‘the pursuit of new
knowledge of things that might come to be known’ and
exploitation as ‘the use and development of things
already known’ (Levinthal and March, 1993).
is typically understood as refocusing through
downsizing of a business unit or the shedding 
of unprofitable units from a multi-unit firm
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994; Markides, 1995;
Robbins and Pearce, 1992). Celltech had only two
divisions, reducing the relevance of these pro-
scriptions. Moreover, its renewal was based on
revitalizing the smaller, unprofitable research
division not the profitable contract division. The
literature on business renewal is more relevant,
for it argues that in exceptional circumstances de-
funct firms or businesses can rejuvenate (Baden-
Fuller and Stopford, 1994; Grinyer, Mayes and
McKiernan, 1988; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991).
Until now, all the evidence has come from the 
so-called mature sectors, and the relevance to
high technology sectors has yet to be established.
For high technology firms, such as those in
bioscience, there are serious technical issues to be
confronted. Given the hyper-competitive nature
of the environment (D’Aveni, 1994), the para-
digmatic shifts in technology (Powell, Koput and
Smith-Doerr, 1996) and the need for fast strategic
moves (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), a serious
question arises as to whether any renewal is pos-
sible and, if it is, whether the models of renewal in
maturity are relevant.
The story of Celltech is unusual on two levels.
First, it is an example of a mature high technology
firm successfully engaging in renewal. Second,
this renewal was focused around a strategy which
enabled the firm to escape the gravity of ex-
ploitation and move towards a model of financially
successful exploration. Its renewal is particularly
unusual in that shareholder value (in terms of
market capitalization) rose after renewal in spite
of the fact that prior to the change in 1990 the
firm had been only marginally profitable, and
from 1990 to 1998 it has posted cumulative net
losses of £75.9 million.
Methods and data collection
We sought to ensure the validity of our data
through rigorous data collection. The first source
of data was five interviews with senior executives
inside our case company, and the analysis of
extensive relevant company documents on invest-
ment, revenues, new product development, clin-
ical trials, and alliances. The second was a search
of public domain data on all independent drug
biotechnology firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange, which included Celltech. The third
source of data was a series of interviews with ex-
ecutives from other bioscience companies, which
helped to check our interpretation. In common
with other case study research, a central output of
the data collection and analysis process was the
writing up of a detailed case study on Celltech
(McNamara, Baden-Fuller and Howell 1997)3, with
a companion note on the biotechnology sector
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Triangulation of data sources
helped to ensure validity (Jicks, 1979; Kirk and
Miller, 1986). Respondent validation was em-
ployed, where executives from the organization
commented on drafts of the case (Silverman,
1993; Whyte, 1984). Through a process of iterative
rewrites, we sought to incorporate a shared
understanding by both the researchers and the
executives of the firm’s story.
The executives in the company were keen to
show us the competencies they had created and
the dilemmas they faced. Being scientists they
were highly articulate, meticulous about the data
in support of their claims and able to point out
sources of data which allowed us to explore the
phenomena under discussion in this article. 
As such the interviews proved to be an excellent
source of data and, despite the small number,
showed a surprising degree of agreement and
comprehensiveness. We have no indication that
further interviews among seniors or juniors would
reveal any significant new insights. To protect the
reliability of our study a chain of evidence was
created and maintained throughout the process
(Yin, 1989). All interviews were transcribed
(usually via tapes). Public documents such as
annual reports, press comments and technical
notes were searched in a methodical manner.
Understanding the processes of knowledge
management and renewal in a high technology
firm presents technical challenges to management
researchers. Our team included a professor of
chemical engineering who has experience of tech-
nical research in the field. His knowledge of the
science was essential in understanding the nuances
of the business and relating these to the man-
agerial processes explored in this article.
Five managers were interviewed from differing
levels in the organization. These were the Chief
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3 The Celltech case study (with teaching note) is avail-
able upon request from the authors.
Executive of the group, the Director of Finance,
the Chief Executive of the Therapeutics division,
the Director of Research, and the Director of
Development. Both the Directors of Develop-
ment and Research were involved in a hands-on
way with actual projects, having been Celltech
project leaders in the 1980s and early 1990s. All
except the Finance Director have PhDs in science
and have previously worked for many years in 
the pharmaceutical sector. These five executives
were pivotal in the reorientation of Celltech’s
strategy in the 1990s. We first interviewed the
group Chief Executive following a broad inter-
view schedule. This interview fleshed out the
overall picture and a new set of interview ques-
tions was developed for the remaining four inter-
views. During early interviews issues arose which
were unexpected, to which follow up questions
were applied both within and across interviews.
By the end of the five interviews, the interviewers
felt that they had obtained an understanding of
the firm. The last interview did not reveal any
significant new information, rather it provided
triangulation of existing data.
An overview of Celltech
Celltech can be viewed as having four basic
historical periods, which link to the balance of 
the exploration and exploitation of knowledge.
For the first decade of its existence, two separate
strands of the business were grown: contract
manufacturing and research (Biologics) and in-
house research and development (Therapeutics).
The goal was to cover the costs of in-house R&D
with revenues generated by doing contract re-
search on behalf of other firms. From Figure 1 we
can see that after an initial period in which R&D
expenditure exceeded Biologics turnover, by 1985
R&D amounted to less than 50% of turnover, and
by 1987 this was at an all time low of 25.5%,
recovering to 50% by 1990.4 In 1987 there were
marginally more employees located in the Thera-
peutics division than in Biologics. By 1990 the
number of staff located in the Biologics contract
research and manufacturing business was at an all
time high of 60%. Hence we refer to this as the
Biologics period. During this period the firm
developed strong technical capabilities (Dodgson,
1991), although executives commented that the
firm was consequently very hierarchical and lacked
capabilities in interdisciplinary research which
were necessary for success in the development of
innovative drugs.
In the second period (1990–1992), a new CEO
joined the firm with a new perspective. He saw
the future as being in the development of inno-
vative new drugs in which Celltech had a slice of
the action. As he puts it, ‘the winners have to be
the companies that are therapeutic because the
value added is so huge’. The firm was formally
split into two divisions, Biologics and Therapeutics,
and the CEO implemented his new strategic vision
by expanding the Therapeutics division. From
Figure 1 we can see that this expansion resulted in
an increase in the amount of inputs devoted to
Therapeutics. The percentage of turnover devoted
to own R&D and the number of employees in the
Therapeutics division both rose sharply. Within
this division the firm developed a capability in the
creation of innovative drugs from initial discovery
through to regulatory clinical trials. This change
in strategy required a shift away from core cap-
abilities centred around technology application
and towards interdisciplinary research to create
new drugs as opposed to new technologies. Thus
we refer to this period as re-asserting R&D, where
the role of R&D was accentuated, while the role
of contract manufacturing and research, in terms
of number of employees and turnover, was
marginally reduced (see Figures 1 and 2).
In 1992 the third period began which lasted
until 1996. From Figure 1 we can see that during
this period the inputs devoted to Biologics and
Therapeutics were largely in balance. The firm
developed a strategy of collaboration with large
pharmaceutical firms in the development of its
drugs. We refer to this as the alliance period. The
benefits of such collaboration were outlined by
the firm as follows:
‘They bring extensive expertise to the planning
and conduct of clinical trials in order to seek
registration for products in a timely manner. They
have marketing expertise and strength in the
therapeutic areas that should allow them to
optimise the launch and market penetration of
new products . . . Collaborative agreements also
demonstrate third party validation of the scientific
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4 Data on turnover and R&D are only available from
1983 onwards. Data on the split of employees by
division were not available prior to 1987.
and commercial potential of innovative discovery or
development programmes.’ (1996 Annual Report)
Current collaborators include some of the leading
pharmaceutical firms in the USA and the EU. 
The quality of Celltech’s collaborators and the
number of drugs it has in both clinical trials and 
in discovery projects compares favourably with 
its major biotechnology rivals. This collaborative
strategy enables Celltech to exploit its know-
ledge base before going to the end market, via
cash milestone payments from collaborators, but
without selling a full interest in the downstream
property rights. Milestone payments and collab-
oration are not unusual in this sector. Celltech
was, however, amongst the first in the UK to suc-
cessfully implement this strategy. It is also unusual
in the breadth and quality of its collaborators.
The fourth period began in 1996 when the
Biologics division was sold for £50 million, thus
we refer to this as the post-Biologics era. This
signalled the final stage of Celltech’s new direc-
tion. In 1990 Biologics dominated the firm to the
detriment of R&D. With the sale of Biologics
Celltech had in six years converted itself into a
firm solely focused on the R&D of innovative
drugs to the exclusion of contract manufacturing
and research. From Figure 1 we can see that all
inputs are now focused on own R&D. The value
of the firm has see-sawed over its life. From near
bankruptcy in 1990, Celltech had been transformed.
By 1998 it had a market capitalization of around
$502 million. An analysis of stock market per-
formance shows that Celltech ranked eighth out
of 50 independent European biotechnology firms,
having experienced a 25% increase in share price
in 1998 (McNamara, 1999). This renewal occurred
not by intensifying the firm’s focus on the ex-
ploitation of organizational knowledge, but rather
by refocusing on exploration.
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Figure 1. Input measures of exploration/exploitation balance: allocation of resources
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Exploration/exploitation as a lens in
understanding Celltech’s renewal
This transformation from Biologics to Therapeutics
can be explained in terms of the exploration/
exploitation balance. We can view investment 
in Biologics as essentially being an investment in
exploitation. Celltech had developed world-class
technical capabilities that leveraged the firm’s
knowledge of antibodies and recombinant DNA
through contracted manufacturing. It is a classic
example of Levinthal and March’s (1993) def-
inition of exploitation as ‘the use and develop-
ment of things already known’. Incremental
development of these capabilities did occur, but
only in the context of learning by doing in the
contract research division. Investment in contract
manufacturing had a rapid feedback from the
market in terms of contracted revenues.
Celltech’s investment in Therapeutics can be
viewed as knowledge exploration in Levinthal
and March’s (1993) terms where exploration is
‘the pursuit of new knowledge of things that might
come to be known’. Drug discovery requires that
knowledge from multiple technical disciplines
(for instance, molecular biology and medicinal
chemistry) be combined in the creation of an
innovative compound that can enter clinical trials.
In 1990 this exploration became more intense 
as the firm sought to develop its capabilities in
interdisciplinary drug discovery. The feedback
from the market is not as clear, nor as fast, as in
the case of Biologics’ contracts. The discovery of
a compound takes on average 3.3 years, though in
many cases considerably longer; the drug develop-
ment process is estimated to take a further 8.2
years on average (Parexel International, 1996).
Only 5 in 5000 compounds that enter discovery
programmes are estimated to make it to develop-
mental clinical trials, and only one of these to
make it on to the market (Berry, 1996). The cost
of taking a drug through this process is estimated
to be in the region of $300–$500 million (BIO,
1996).
From Figure 2 we can see that Celltech was ex-
periencing very considerable growth in Biologics
turnover from 1987 to 1989. Gross margins attrib-
uted to the Biologics activity, while falling, were
quite high, ranging from over 31% to 12.5%. On
the back of Biologics’ success the firm was able to
invest £17.3 million in Therapeutics R&D during
this period, while also generating a net profit of
£900 000. Therapeutics was not generating any
turnover during this period. In this context one
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Figure 2. Performance of Celltech Biologics
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can see that for a firm such as Celltech in the
1980s, the temptation to focus resources on ex-
ploitation rather than exploration was very real.
The balance between exploration and ex-
ploitation in Celltech can be seen from two per-
spectives: allocation of resources to each activity
(Figure 1) and revenues generated (Figure 3). As
noted earlier, from Figure 1 we can see that from
1985 to 1990 investment in Celltech’s own R&D
as a percentage of group turnover initially de-
clined, and remained below 32% until 1990, when
it dramatically increased to 49% with the arrival
of the new management team. The number of
employees working in the Therapeutics division
declined over the period from 1987 to 1990.
Employee numbers is a key metric as both R&D
and contract manufacturing and research are
knowledge and labour intensive activities.
In addition to a rising commitment to Biologics
in terms of inputs, as seen in Figure 1, there was a
parallel rise in level of turnover, or outputs, that
Biologics generated (see Figure 3). Combining
Figures 1 and 3 we can see that during the period
from 1985 to 1990 exploitation (Biologics) came
to dominate over exploration (Therapeutics).
The reasserting R&D period from 1990 to 1992
can be seen in Figure 1 in terms of a sustained rise
in the percentage of employees located in Thera-
peutics. New employees were hired within Thera-
peutics while there were redundancies within
Biologics. Figure 3 indicates that in terms of one
simple output measure, turnover, the Therapeutics
division was also beginning to make an impact.
Retrenchment in the Biologics division can be
seen in Figure 3 in terms of a decline in turnover
generated by the division. Thus we can see that
the imbalance between Biologics and Therapeutics
in terms of resource inputs and revenue outputs
began to be reversed.
The alliance period represents a time of sus-
tained balance between the inputs allocated to
both exploration (Therapeutics) and exploitation
(Biologics). From Figure 1 we can see that the
number of employees located in each division is
largely in balance. From Figure 2 we can see that
the performance in Biologics in terms of margins
improved over the period. From Figure 3 we 
can see that both divisions experienced a rise in
revenues up to 1995, and a proportional decline in
1996. Thus over a period of half a decade, from
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Figure 3. Output measure of exploration/exploitation balance: revenue
Exploitation dominates:
the Biologics period
(1985–1990)
Rebalancing:
reasserting
R&D
(1990–1992)
Balance:
the alliance period
(1992–1996)
Exploration
dominates?
The
post-Biologics
era
(1996–1998)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
20 000
15 000
10 000
5000
0
£'
00
0s
Biologics Therapeutics
1992 to 1996, exploration and exploitation in
terms of inputs (Figure 1) and outputs (Figures 2
and 3) were largely in balance.
Exploration/exploitation inside Therapeutics
At the start of the fourth period, in 1996, the
Biologics division was sold off. Therapeutics had
developed its own sophisticated balance of ex-
ploration and exploitation dimensions. There were
(and still are) three aspects of exploration within
Therapeutics: discovery of new drugs; phase one
clinical trials; and development of a capability in
collaboration with large firms. Exploration within
this division can be seen in its purest form as the
discovery of new drugs. Drug discovery by its very
nature involves ‘the pursuit of new knowledge of
things that might come to be known’ (Levinthal
and March, 1993). The objective is the discovery
of a new innovative compound which tackles 
an illness that currently lacks a drug therapy, or 
a compound that is based on a sufficiently novel
combination of knowledge that it does not violate
current patented compounds. From Figure 45
we can see that from 1990 to 1998 Celltech has
considerably increased the number of identified
discovery projects.
The second exploration activity in Therapeutics
is the movement of a compound from discovery
into Phase I clinical trials. Phase I trials seek 
to establish the safety of the drug on healthy
volunteers. These trials represent about 10% of
the cost of performing clinical trials (Parexel
International, 1996). Phase I trials represent the
first application of the drug on humans. While test-
ing on animals may have occurred in pre-clinical
trials, the move to man is uncertain. Much new
knowledge is generated at this stage. From Figure
4 we can see that this form of exploration peaked
during the period of balance between 1992 and
1996, and that a reduction in Phase I trials during
1997 and 1998 has been offset, in exploratory
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Figure 4. Balancing exploration and exploitation in Therapeutics
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terms, by a rise in the number of identified dis-
covery projects.
The third exploration activity is the creation of
the capability to collaborate with large pharma-
ceutical firms. By 1990 two drugs were in clinical
trials, and the number has risen dramatically since
then (see Figure 4). This has been achieved by
accessing the drug development capabilities of
large pharmaceutical partners through collab-
oration, with the partner taking the lead in the
management of clinical trials. Through interaction
with pharmaceutical partners on development
projects, Celltech has, according to executives
within the firm, developed a capability in man-
aging collaborations with large firms. The initial
development of this capability can be viewed as
another example of exploration.
Exploitation is defined as ‘the use and devel-
opment of things already known’ by Levinthal
and March (1993). We can observe two major
forms of development and use (exploitation) in-
side Therapeutics. First is the conduct of Phase II
and Phase III clinical trials, which can be viewed
as the development of things already known.
These trials are essentially development and use
of knowledge, as embedded in the compound,
rather than classic exploration. Phase II trials
involve establishing the tolerable range and most
effective dosage on patients suffering the illness.
Phase III trials involve further controlled tests
where the efficacy and safety of the drug is com-
pared relative to other treatments. Phase II trials
represent about 30% and Phase III trials about
60% of the costs of the clinical trial process
(Parexel International, 1996). From Figure 4 we
can see that the number of Phases II and III
clinical trials increased marginally in the period 
of reasserting R&D (1990–1992), while in the
alliance period (1992–1996) there was both an
increase (in 1993) and a slight decline (in 1996). In
the post-Biologics era there has been an increase
in the number of drugs in Phase II trials, repre-
senting an increasing focus on exploitation.
The second form of exploitation is the manage-
ment of prestige alliances. Prestige alliances can
be viewed as predominately exploitative. This ex-
ploitation occurs on four fronts. First, alliance
partners provide milestone payments to Celltech
for achieving prescribed stages in the discovery
and development of a drug. Second, prestige
alliances enable Celltech to access world-class
drug development and marketing capabilities,
which enhances the value of their drug portfolio.
This access is critical to the development of the
knowledge embedded in the discovered compound.
Celltech had little development experience in
1990, and no experience of the worldwide market-
ing and distribution of drugs. Access to these cap-
abilities enables it to exploit its discovered
compounds. Third, through these collaborations
Celltech has over time learned to develop, or
deepen, its own initially limited drug development
capabilities, such that it now seeks to take on an
increasing role in the management of clinical
trials, particularly Phase I and Phase II trials. Such
learning can be viewed as development of current
knowledge under the Levinthal and March (1993)
definition of exploitation. Fourth, alliances with
prestige partners bring with them a validation of
both Celltech’s technology and its corporate
strategy. This validation was vital to Celltech in
raising its perceived value among investors prior
to its launch on the London Stock Exchange in
1993. Post-1997 it was also vital in the recovery of
Celltech’s share price after the collapse of a Phase
III clinical trial and the loss of Bayer as a prestige
alliance partner (McNamara, 1998).
Figure 4 offers a set of metrics from which 
we can see the balance between exploration and
exploitation that has been achieved within the
Therapeutics division. From Figure 4 we can see
that the amount of exploration within Thera-
peutics has risen over time. In 1990 there were
two discovery projects and one Phase I clinical
trial. By 1998 there were six discovery projects
but no Phase I clinical trials; the renewal of
Celltech coincided with a rise in the number of
exploration projects inside Therapeutics. From
Figure 4 we can see that prior to 1993 the number
of exploration projects within Therapeutics ex-
ceeded the exploitation activities, however from
1993 onwards the number of exploitation activities
increase. By 1998 there is a greater emphasis on
exploitation projects than exploration, suggesting
that Celltech may once again be moving out of
balance.
From core rigidities to new core
competencies: exploiting shocks to
overcome organizational inertia
How did Celltech engineer the changes? In par-
ticular how did it reverse the decline of exploration
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and create the more balanced, higher value Thera-
peutics division? Our interview data revealed the
following to be important:
• the existence of a series of crises in 1990 (as
partially reflected in Figure 2);
• a new CEO and top management;
• redundancies in the Biologics division simul-
taneous with the hiring of thirty medicinal
chemists, injecting a new knowledge base into
Therapeutics;
• the reforming of teams from a functional
organization of technically orientated teams
to multi-functional project-orientated teams;
and
• the development of a shared culture and
language across the firm.
In the next few pages we elaborate on what these
changes entailed and why they were important.
It was clear that at the end of the 1980s 
there was a high level of inertia and resistance to
change from within Celltech. Biologics had been
the source of Celltech’s revenue growth. The old
management had committed itself to a technology
focus, not interdisciplinary research. Strong col-
laborative ties had been formed with academia
and were viewed as central to the future of the
firm (Dodgson, 1993). At its foundation, the
central focus of Celltech had been a technology
transfer agreement with the Medical Research
Council which sought to exploit academic know-
ledge commercially. From contemporary annual
reports and Dodgson’s (1993) study of Celltech’s
first decade, we can see that management was
strongly committed to the continuation and
strengthening of this agreement, having nego-
tiated in 1988 an extension of the contract until
1993. Employees had come to jokingly refer to
Celltech as the ‘University of Slough’. One
executive noted that:
‘Almost a third of its R&D spend was on these
[academic] collaborations. I can say that almost
universally they were very non-productive. They
were quite a cash drain on the company.’
On the Therapeutics side, research seemed to lack
focus and was largely unproductive (some depart-
ments consisted of only two people). Change would
have to overcome the firm’s past commitment to
collaboration with academia, and the accompany-
ing culture, and a reliance on profits from Biologics
based upon the development and application of
technological capabilities reinforced by academic
ties and hierarchical structures.
Creating a crisis
Huff, Huff and Thomas (1992) note that shocks
are needed to engineer change and that that rarely
is a single shock to a managerial system sufficient.
A single shock can be rationalized away as an
aberration, or a temporary occurrence. Ordin-
arily, as in the case of Celltech, a radical departure
from the status quo is only triggered by a series of
significant shocks to the system, which are bunched
closely together. Celltech encountered a series of
three distinct shocks. First came the financial
shocks of 1989 to 1992. We can see from Figure 2
that Biologics’s gross margins were in consid-
erable decline from 1988 to 1990. The rate of
growth of Biologics’s turnover was declining over
this period, and from 1990 to 1992 was negative.
Declining performance over a period of several
years could not easily be explained away. Second,
Celltech’s major shareholder, with a 36.4% stake,
went bankrupt in 1990. This placed further
pressure on Celltech to address its poor financial
performance. Third, the retirement of both the
founding CEO and Research Director was
scheduled for 1990. This, combined with the two
other shocks, offered a window of opportunity in
which change could be initiated and inertial
forces overcome.
The challenge that these shocks posed should
not be underestimated. Shareholder pressure for
change was intense. One senior executive recalled
the mood of the time, saying:
‘It was relayed to us by the original investors that
“You are smart guys. You can tell us a nice story,
but how do we know it’s valid?” You see, six or
seven years ago, very few financial institutions
knew anything much about science, let alone the
pharmaceutical industry. They felt that they had
already been hoodwinked by one group of man-
agement and so what they said was we had to do
something quite distinctive that made them
believe there was something special about us.’
To impress the shareholders new directions in
strategy were necessary, new capabilities had to be
developed and scarce resources refocused. A new
management team was hired which had to drive
Celltech towards its ultimate goal of becoming a
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large R&D-led company that took drugs to
market. The old capability focused on the con-
tract manufacturing of antibodies and collabora-
tive links with universities to maintain a leading
edge functional technology focus (Dodgson, 1991,
1993). New capabilities needed to be developed to
focus on new product development, rather than
technical excellence. As one executive commented:
‘An organisation of this type is not judged by the
output of scientific papers. It is actually judged by
its ability to come up with technologies which in
turn will lead to therapeutic entities. The tech-
nology itself is fairly valueless until you convert it
into something practical . . . What I think we
emphasised, if anything, was to say that, if that is
the basis on which we are judged, then clearly if
we cannot convert our technology into practical
realities, we will be complete failures.’
Unlearning, reorganizing and new recruits
As capability development is path dependent,
behaviour can become deeply embedded and in-
hibit, rather than promote, actions that add value.
Unlearning is defined by Hedberg (1981) as ‘a
process through which learners discard know-
ledge’ which is ‘obsolete and misleading’. Imai,
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1985) have equated this
process of unlearning with Schumpeter’s process
of creative destruction. Unlearning is critical to
the broader issue of organizational learning pro-
cesses, as has been noted by Bettis and Prahalad
(1995) and Huber (1991). New orgnizations are
less disadvantaged than are established firms
because they have less to discard.
The task of ‘unlearning’ can be viewed as a
considerable organizational challenge, because
the effort and risks involved in switching from
one capability to another can be substantial. The
interplay between the bundles of resources and
capabilities necessary to create a new capability
will, at the outset, be poorly understood since the
creation of organizational knowledge is by def-
inition a complex and uncertain process. Kogut
and Zander (1992) articulate this risk in their
study when they note that:
‘Switching to new capabilities is difficult as neither
the knowledge embedded in the current relation-
ships and principles is well understood, nor the
social fabric required to support the new learning
known.’
In the case of Celltech the switch from tech-
nological capability to a more therapeutic-based
capability was a considerable challenge. Renewal
was not just a matter of changing strategic direc-
tion. More fundamentally, it required a change in
the way staff thought about science and how
research was organized. This ideological change is
encapsulated in the move away from an almost
academic culture, where close collaborative ties
with academia were mirrored in structures that
executives described as like an academic institu-
tion. As one executive commented, change re-
quired a shift away from an academic philosophy
of technical excellence, measured in part by 
the number of scientific papers published, and
towards a more commercially-minded focus on
getting products into the clinic. Another executive
noted that this required ‘almost a sea change in
the way that we were organised’.
Research was reorganized with teams focusing
around three therapeutic targets selected by the
new management. Biologists of differing special-
ities were put in teams to work towards a com-
mon goal. Previously they had worked within
functional groupings. Now scientists of differing
functional expertise worked together within spe-
cific projects. Each project had a goal of bringing
a drug to clinical trials, thus improving the firm’s
research productivity. This meant that teams no
longer focused on the development of technical
expertise alone, but upon the combination of
technical expertise to develop novel therapeutic
compounds.
Mixing old and new functions within common
projects required scientists to learn about issues
outside their previous speciality. To do this they
had to focus more on these skills and less on their
specialist skills, which had been their sole pre-
vious focus, thus facilitating unlearning. This
process of socialization, a new challenge, a new
vision of the future, and a narrowly defined focus
of work (three therapeutic areas with individual
teams looking at narrower issues) enabled a shift
in capability to occur. (The success of this strategy,
in terms of research productivity and acceptance
by stakeholders, cumulated in the divestment of
Biologics.)
Intellectual diversity is essential for change and
exploration to create new capabilities (Carley,
1992; Javanovic and Nyarko, 1995; Simon, 1991).
It was the new senior management recruited from
outside Celltech which brought with it this new
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perspective on how the firm could achieve suc-
cess. Additionally, the senior management team
brought new skills, including knowledge of asthma
therapies, which had not previously been a focus
at Celltech. The strategy also involved hiring 35
medicinal chemists who were dispersed across the
projects as required. These new staff members
enlarged Celltech’s skill base from biotechnology
and into the more traditional medicinal chemistry
skills of pharmaceutical firms. But all this change
was risky. Old employees might not have adapted
to the new change. New teams might not have
‘gelled’.
Systems to foster the coexistence of exploration
and exploitation
What other factors did Celltech use to engineer
the change? Many have noted that a firm’s social
system plays an important role in determining the
speed and path of learning (Brown and Duguid,
1989; Imai, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1985; Kay,
1993; Orr, 1990; Simon, 1991). Changes in either
the degree of control maintained over social
interaction between actors within the firm or the
structure of communications between actors can
facilitate improvements in shared understanding
between organizational members of how tasks
should be performed (Blacker, 1995; Cyert and
March, 1963; Huber, 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi,
1995).
Nonaka’s work indicates the central role of
social processes in the ‘spiral’ of knowledge
creation, which he views as a key to the success of
firms (Nonaka 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).
In Nonaka’s view the development of capabilities
within firms involves a process of the conversion
of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge, ex-
plicit into tacit, and from one form of explicit or
tacit knowledge to another. For Nonaka the driv-
ing forces for these transfers between forms of
knowledge are attempts to create new knowledge
and to improve the efficiency of integration of
existing knowledge into the firm. Nonaka sees
movements to or from tacit knowledge as involv-
ing a high degree of social interaction.
The new management of Celltech paid particu-
lar attention to managing exploration for new
knowledge and exploitation of the knowledge
derived from exploration activities by creating
a series of systems to manage drug discovery 
and development. The management of current
projects and the search for new research ideas
involves both formal and informal systems. Close
proximity is an informal mechanism; all staff are
located on one site and the layout of the building
is specially designed to facilitate interactions. More
formal mechanisms include quarterly reviews of
the progress of projects. If they are not meeting
objective milestones, then reasons are elicited
from the team. If senior management believes
that these problems are not solvable within the
present budget and time frames due to resource
or capability deficiencies, then projects are quickly
shut down. Annual reviews enable the scientists
to interact with senior management in budget
allocations for the coming year. Strategic research
reviews are conducted periodically. Through
these reviews, ideas on new projects bubble up.
Often the original ideas upon which new project
proposals submitted during the research review
are based stem from the conferences which the
scientific staff have attended, or literature they
have read, in which interesting ideas were raised
and then independently pursued by themselves
during slack time. A senior executive describes
the essence of how new ideas bubble up, culmin-
ating in the strategic review, as follows:
‘You don’t say that we are going to have a meeting
next Thursday. There usually is a lot of discussion
about the ideas. Eventually they [the proposals]
come forward, but they don’t come forward as a
surprise on Thursday afternoon, to be decided by
the end of the day. Because we are a small com-
pany you are always talking to people, so you have
a good idea of what ideas are being discussed. It is
almost a constant process of seeing what’s new,
what we might do, what’s exciting.’
Common codes and shared language
For new knowledge to be created and current
knowledge to be integrated across the organ-
ization, there needs to be investment in a shared
language amongst the individuals involved
(Blacker, 1995; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
DeGeus, 1996; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Just
as academics develop precise codes to facilitate
the transfer of ideas amongst themselves, so people
in organizations generally need to express their
ideas in terms that their colleagues understand.
Given the central role of individuals in knowledge
creation, without the transfer of knowledge be-
tween individuals organizational knowledge would
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be unlikely to develop to a commercial level, if at
all. The creation and development of a basic com-
mon language is a costly and uncertain task. When
creating and integrating complex knowledge into
organizational routines and directions, it is likely
that the opportunity for misunderstandings will
develop. This integration of knowledge occurs
across several functions, and the problem of
shared knowledge becomes more pronounced.
In the case of Celltech, when it changed from 
a discipline and technology-based capability to 
a therapeutic capability, chemists were thrust
together with biologists leading to differences in
common understandings. Disciplines that within
Celltech had previously worked in hierarchical
isolation now had to converse and work side by
side on an operational level to integrate their
diverse knowledge into the production of a single
drug. This required colleagues to train each other
in the basics of their discipline. In so doing, know-
ledge overlaps and redundancies were created.
An understanding of the language and mindsets
of other disciplines facilitated a deeper under-
standing of the problems facing the firm. Triggers
for innovative solutions were set off through this
process of developing shared understanding at the
level of bench scientists. The Director of Research
summed up the effect of putting people with di-
fferent skill bases into common teams by noting:
‘We were very much organised along technical
disciplines for quite a long time, which gave us a
very good strength in technology but maybe not a
good strength in biology. We found that when we
moved into the therapeutic areas we were able to
get people to be focused on biological questions
so that they built up their biology base. So we had
people who had a lot of interest in inflammation,
and these people built up a knowledge base around
inflammation as opposed to being molecular biolo-
gists, or cell biologists or biochemists.’ The re-
organisation ‘challenged [researchers] with learning
more about the biology, rather than just learning
about techniques and technology’.
The need to create shared language at the
operational levels of the firm was mirrored by the
need to create a shared understanding with
external collaborators. The search for and manage-
ment of external collaborations was conducted at
the middle and higher levels of management.
Senior management at Celltech found that its
collaborators tended to think differently. This
makes communications across firm boundaries a
slow process, where firms learn to talk to each
other, and learn the meaning of their objectives,
mindsets and systems, thus slowing the transfer of
knowledge needed to collaborate.
An example was Celltech’s collaboration with
Bayer. The decision-making structures of the
firms were quite different. Bayer focused on in-
depth commercial analysis of the project first, and
then on meticulous large-scale clinical trials. Ac-
cording to a Celltech executive, decisions taken
by the Bayer members of the project team some-
times needed to be ratified by several layers 
of management. Celltech did not focus on com-
mercial analysis in as much depth as Bayer, nor
did it have a lot of experience as a company in
conducting large-scale clinical trials, especially at
Phase III. Celltech’s expertise was in the dis-
covery of novel compounds, and there was only
one level of management between the project
manager and the CEO. These issues, amongst
others, led to different ways of working in Celltech
and Bayer. To work together these alternative
systems had to be understood by the Celltech
management and accommodated for. This ini-
tially slowed the project, however it offered ex-
cellent opportunities to learn the management of
alliances with large firms. This process can also
help a firm to recognize and learn of gaps in its
own knowledge bases, stimulating the managerial
processes of both exploration and exploitation.
For example, Celltech recently hired a senior
manager with expertise in the marketing of
pharmaceutical products to fill a gap in its know-
ledge of commercial analysis. Its expertise in clin-
ical trial development has been deepened through
learning from alliances with Bayer and other
large pharmaceutical firms, all of which are
widely experienced in the management of large-
scale clinical trials.
Discussion
The renewal of Celltech provides four key lessons.
First, contrary to suggestions in the literature,
renewal is possible through a movement away
from exploitation and towards exploration. The
key to such a renewal strategy is that it be based
firmly on the principle of adding shareholder
value. By moving away from the low margin but
profitable Biologics, and towards loss-making
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drug discovery and development, the firm in-
creased its market value. During this period the
firm raised a further £41.7 million from share-
holders. The new management realized that
shareholders were not interested in short-term
profits but rather in longer-term capital gains.
Paradoxically, bigger losses that focus on the
right sort investments can mean bigger potential
gains. By intensifying investments in explora-
tion to develop a strong Therapeutics division,
the capital value of Celltech rose, despite an
intensification of losses to £75.9 million due to
increased R&D.
Celltech moved to exploration not just in terms
of new scientific capabilities, but also in terms of
new managerial capabilities. This is a key lesson
of the Celltech renewal. Renewal based on ex-
ploration requires coordinating changes in both
technical and managerial capabilities. Celltech
would have failed if it had only renewed its
technical capabilities and ignored the creation of
capabilities in managing collaboration and a new
relationship with shareholders.
The second lesson is that the management of
crisis and galvanizing the commitment of key
organizational actors is essential in overcoming
organizational inertia to renew. This is not a new
lesson, having been championed by Baden-Fuller
and Stopford (1994), Pascale (1990) and others. In
Celltech, new management entered the firm but
was cautious at first, galvanizing the commitment
of a key group of scientists and administrators
prior to announcing the change in strategy from
technology focus to project groups orientated
around the creation of individual drugs. Having
gained the commitment of the key scientists in the
firm the sense of crisis, which had been growing
amongst staff, was relieved. The new team also
brought with it a sense of credibility, being made
up of accomplished research scientists and pharma-
ceutical administrators from Roche Holdings,
amongst others. The key here is that a relatively
small number of new managers stepped into the
crisis, untainted by its past, galvanized a small
number of key actors within the organization, and
then presented the staff with a new strategic
vision which was not only endorsed as acceptable
by shareholders, but which also excited and
motivated staff. As one manager put it, the staff
were released from the constraints of contract
manufacturing and research, in which they had no
long-term stake, and could now engage in big,
liberated science where their scientific skills and
creativity could be profitability pursued.
The third lesson is that for a firm to renew
based on exploration it needs to stimulate know-
ledge creation through an injection of both ex-
ternal and internal diversity. External diversity
was infused through the arrival of the new senior
management team. This brought new ideas on
what the strategic focus of the firm should be, in
addition to a knowledge of how large pharma-
ceutical firms operate, which was fostered to de-
velop a capability in managing prestige alliances.
External diversity also came in the form of the
new medicinal chemists. Inappropriate knowledge
was partially extinguished by the redundancy of
60 staff, which when combined with structural
changes signalled that the old ways of doing
things were not to continue. Internal diversity was
stimulated by the creation of the new teams
organised around drug projects. Executives noted
that the majority of new project ideas came from
the creative resources of those staff who existed
in Celltech prior to 1990.
The fourth, and we believe most important,
lesson from the renewal of Celltech is that for
exploration to be sustained it is vital that systems
be installed to ensure that the outputs of ex-
ploration activities are clearly linked to the firm’s
exploitative efforts. These processes occurred at
two levels of the organisations. At the operational
level, new capabilities in interdisciplinary research
were developed. At the upper management level,
capabilities in the management of collaboration
were developed. Regular research reviews were
initiated which enabled a project to be assessed in
terms of its ability to deliver tangible results in a
timely and cost effective manner, and the ability
of the project to attract and retain collaborators
(the relationships with which were identified,
cultivated and managed by senior management).
As drugs exited discovery projects, they were
assessed by a Product Development Panel, which
sought to assess if each drug should move into
the development, or exploitation, stage of the
R&D process. These systems ensure that a tight
linkage between exploration and exploitation is
maintained.
Systems were also put in place to ensure that a
balance between exploration and exploitation
was maintained over time. As drugs exit the
discovery stage, the research review process seeks
to identify new discovery projects. Ideas bubble
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up from the operational level and are assessed by
the middle management, and reviewed by senior
management. This process, coupled with a system
of strategic review, seeks to ensure that exploit-
ation does not drive out exploration in Celltech.
This temptation is real because as a drug moves
through Phase II and three trials the costs rise
dramatically, while the time to market is dimin-
ishing. The temptation is to cut investment in
discovery projects so that these funds can be
devoted to late stage clinical trials.
Conclusions
Theoretical development has posed a challenge to
organizations. On the one hand they are told
that they must balance exploration activities with
exploitation activities if they are to maximize
their value. On the other hand, firms are told that
in general, maturity brings inertia and decline as
exploitation drives out the creation of new ideas.
All too often, people have drawn the conclusion
that high technology firms live on a knife edge and
that having fallen, renewal is likely to be almost
impossible (Christensen, 1997) or the result of
serendipity (Burgelman, 1994).
Our case study throws into doubt some of these
theoretical presumptions. We document the re-
newal of a high technology firm from near bank-
ruptcy and paralysis to a high level of success.
More importantly, we demonstrate that this re-
newal was not ‘accidental’, but rather the ap-
plication of well tried and tested managerial
techniques which included a new CEO, the hiring
of new staff from a different discipline, the
formation of new team structures and the infusion
of new organizational processes.
Much of the past research into the balance
between exploration and exploitation has relied
on the generation of mathematical models as op-
posed to organizational case studies (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990, 1994; Levinthal, 1997; March,
1991). Instrumental cases can be useful in theory
testing (Eisenhardt, 1989) and theory extension
(Yin, 1989) or theory development (Sutton and
Straw, 1995). We carefully selected the Celltech
case such that it could act as an instrumental 
case allowing us to explore whether or not it 
was possible both to renew based on turning
back the tide of exploitation and to maintain a
balance between investments in exploration and
exploitation. The literature would suggest that
both phenomena are difficult, and by implica-
tion rarely achieved. By employing an alternative
method to prior research, based on a longitudinal
case study as opposed to a mathematical model,
this article has offered further insights into both
the process of renewal and the management 
of the tension between exploration and exploita-
tion inside a high technology firm.
Based on our single case study we do not
suggest that all failing high technology firms can
renew, but we would suggest that future case
researchers examine the relevance of well tried
and tested renewal techniques to those which do
succeed (and a sample of those which do not). We
also suggest that research be undertaken into
firms which have sustained a balance of explor-
ation and exploitation over time to assess whether
their achievements are quirks, and therefore do
not challenge the theoretical proposition that
there is a natural tendency for exploitation to
drive out exploration, or the result of applying
definable management techniques. Further mul-
tiple case research could reveal whether the Cell-
tech case is unique (Yin, 1989) or one of many
cases which cast doubt on prior theoretical
generalizations.
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